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ABSTRACT 
Tax authorities are still facing unresolved issues of a company‘s tax planning 
activities, whether they involve direct or indirect taxes. In Malaysia direct tax is the 
fundamental source of the government‘s income. The transformations in the tax 
systems and accounting standards have given companies opportunities to manage 
their tax affairs for the benefit of their shareholders. This study reports results of the 
relationship between tax disclosure and tax planning. At the same time it also 
considers corporate governance as a moderating influence. This study used a large 
sample of non-financial listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. To this end, the study 
used dataset of hand-gathered information from 286 company financial statements 
for the fiscal years 2010 to 2012. The results indicate that tax planning exhibits a 
strong positive relationship with tax disclosure, which is unconditional upon 
corporate governance. This relationship can be further explained as tax disclosure 
exhibits a significant positive association with the tax losses component of tax 
saving, but has a significant negative relationship with permanent differences 
component of tax saving and the temporary differences component of tax saving. 
This study contributes to the field of taxation in that it uses the ETR reconciliations 
to measure the level of tax disclosure in financial statements. Moreover, it 
contributes to the discussion of who verifies and benefits from tax disclosure 
conducted by companies. The findings of this study also contribute to the body of 
knowledge since there is a general dearth of published research that investigates 
these relationships, particularly in Malaysia. 
Keywords: tax disclosure, tax planning, corporate governance, component of tax 
saving, effective tax rate 
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ABSTRAK 
Pihak berkuasa cukai masih berhadapan dengan isu-isu aktiviti perancangan cukai 
syarikat yang masih belum selesai, sama ada yang melibatkan cukai langsung 
ataupun tidak langsung. Di Malaysia cukai langsung adalah sumber asas pendapatan 
kerajaan. Perubahan dalam sistem cukai dan piawaian perakaunan telah 
memberikan syarikat peluang untuk menguruskan hal ehwal cukai mereka untuk 
manfaat pemegang saham. Kajian ini melaporkan dapatan mengenai hubungan 
antara pendedahan cukai dan perancangan cukai. Pada masa yang sama, ia turut 
mengambil kira tadbir urus korporat sebagai penyederhana. Kajian ini 
menggunakan sampel yang besar, iaitu syarikat bukan kewangan yang tersenarai di 
Bursa Malaysia. Untuk tujuan kajian ini, set data telah dikumpulkan sendiri dari 
penyata kewangan 286 syarikat bagi tahun kewangan bermula 2010 sehingga 2012. 
Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa perancangan cukai mempamerkan hubungan 
positif yang signifikan dengan pendedahan cukai, tanpa pengaruh urus tadbir 
korporat. Hubungan ini berlaku kerana pendedahan cukai menunjukkan hubungan 
positif yang signifikan dengan komponen kerugian cukai penjimatan cukai, tetapi 
mempunyai hubungan negatif yang signifikan dengan komponen perbezaan tetap 
penjimatan cukai dan komponen perbezaan sementara penjimatan cukai. Kajian ini 
menyumbang kepada bidang percukaian melalui penggunaan penyesuaian ETR 
untuk mengukur tahap pendedahan cukai dalam penyata kewangan. Selain itu, ia 
menyumbang kepada perbincangan tentang siapa yang mengesahkan dan mendapat 
manfaat daripada pendedahan cukai yang dijalankan oleh syarikat. Akhir sekali 
kajian ini turutmenyumbang kepada badan pengetahuan akibat kurangnya 
penyelidikan yang mengkaji hubungan ini, terutamanya di Malaysia. 
 
Kata kunci: pendedahan cukai, perancangan cukai, tadbir urus korporat, komponen 
penjimatan cukai, kadar cukai berkesan 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis examines the association between tax planning and tax disclosure, whilst also 
considers the function of corporate governance as a moderator that affects the relation. 
After controlling for company-specific characteristics (i.e. firm size, dividends and 
industry sector), this study begins by investigating the association between tax disclosure 
and tax planning, before examining how corporate governance may moderate the 
association. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the Scholes-Wolfson tax 
planning framework (Scholes, 2009) are the basis of the hypotheses development. The 
discussion in this chapter begins with the background of study, problem statement and 
motivation behind this study, research questions, research objectives and an overview of 
the research methodology. Following that, discuss the importance of this study, the thesis 
structure and conclusion.  
1.1 Background of Study 
Taxation is the government‘s main source of revenue and, thus, it is the most important 
contributor to public spending. Therefore, corporations are increasingly taking taxes into 
consideration seriously in today's world (Sabli & Noor, 2012). Nevertheless, tax-payers, 
specifically companies, continue to perceive taxes to be a burden. This perception stems 
from the fact that corporations, in general, are sceptical about paying substantial taxes to 
the tax authorities. This resistance makes them likely to engage in tax planning strategies 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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